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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 04/01/2008

Accident number: 459

Accident time: 08:57

Accident Date: 10/07/2004

Where it occurred: MF ID 11162,
"Tvornica -BNTSlimena 1", Slime
Village, Travnik

Country: Bosnia Herzegovina

Primary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Vegetation removal
accident

Date of main report: 19/07/2004

ID original source: Broj: 02-OK-153647/04

Name of source: BHMAC WL

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PROM-1 AP Bfrag

Ground condition: metal fragments
metal scrap
trees
woodland (bush)

Date record created: 04/01/2008

Date last modified: 04/01/2008

No of victims: 4

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: G/K 6474676 4895881 Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
vegetation clearance problem (?)
safety distances ignored (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
inadequate area marking (?)
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Accident report
This report was made available in 2006 and translated in 2007 specifically for entry to the
DDAS. The content of the reports that were made available has been edited for anonymity
and is summarised below.
Based on an initial report delivered to BHMAC by the demining organisation on the 10th of
July 2004, the director of BHMAC formed an investigative committee with the following
members: [Name removed] (presiding), [Name removed], [Name removed] and [Name
removed]. This committee created a report which is the main information source for the
DDAS. Another document from BHMAC was available: “Lessons Learned from the Demining
Accident on 7 March 2004”, dated 22 July 2004, three days after the accident report, signed
by the BHMAC director, [Name removed]. This second document contains no new information
and repeats the recommendations of the investigative committee.

Conditions at the site
Before the investigative committee arrived to the scene of accident, the police (MUP Travnik)
had already finished their investigation. The killed deminer had already been transported from
the scene of accident. As a member of the police force, one of the members of the BHMAC
investigative committee, [Name removed], had participated in the police investigation.
The purpose of the demining task was to enable safe work in the factory BNT. The part next
to the fence was mined by the Yugoslav Peoples Army at the beginning of the war. The
Croatian Defence Council and the Army of B&H fought against each other at that area later.
After the war, there were two mine-related accidents inside the factory. Three PROM-1 mines
were removed by the municipality branch of the Civil Defence Travnik in 1997.
The most risky part of the demining task is the area between the asphalt areas in the back
yard of the factory. The area towards the fence is tilted [sloping]. These tilted areas are used
(the factory was working at the time of the clearance operation) for the disposal of metal
waste from the factory and branches from the neighbouring trees. On this risky area, the
vegetation is dense and high with grass, bushes and some trees. At the time of accident, the
weather was clear and sunny, temperature 20 degrees.

[The site of the accident.]
The work-site layout and marking
The work-site had been properly marked, according to the SOP and the National Standard of
B&H.
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Supervision and discipline on the work-site; quality assurance
The team leader was [Name removed], who is knowledgeable and experienced. The next
level of supervision was the work-site leader (name not given). According to available
records, there had been no significant objections to the organisation and the discipline at the
work-site. Internal quality control was conducted by [Name removed], twice a week. His
reports from the last month contained no important objections. However, the inspections of
RO Travnik of BHMAC had reported some critical mistakes during five previous visits to the
work site. They found a metal piece 3x3cm on an area cleared with prodders; visible metal
fragments on cleared areas; broken marking tapes; large productivity in a lane cleared with a
prodder; an area of 2 m2 covered with rubble not searched at all. All mistakes had been
corrected within a given deadline. Additional monitoring was performed by SFOR (UN
protection forces), but their reports are not delivered to the work-site.

Communication and connections
The communications meet the National Standard. Mostly mobile phones are used.

The accident and the medical support
The medical support was appropriate (equipment, vehicle and personnel). The Paramedic
was Ms [Name removed]. The accident required additional vehicles because four persons
were injured. An ordinary vehicle was used for transport of some injured deminers. After the
accident, deminer [Name removed] provided the first aid. After three minutes the paramedic
arrived at the scene of accident with her vehicle. Deminer [Victim No.1] was conscious, so
she gave him first-aid. The other three victims were not moving. [Victim No.1] was moved to
the first-aid vehicle and transported to the nearest hospital. The paramedic stayed at the
work-site. She gave first-aid to [Victim No.2], whose artery on his left leg was bleeding. She
also helped him to breath. After that she felt the pulse of [Victim No.3] – his pulse was very
weak. The team leader and some workers from the factory gathered at the site of accident.
[Victim No.2] was transported to hospital Travnik with a civilian vehicle borrowed from the
factory, the paramedic travelling with him. She came back quickly afterwards; a medical
vehicle had arrived already to the work-site. [Victim No.3] was transported to the hospital,
together with the paramedic. Meanwhile, other two medical vehicles appeared (from the
Health Centre Travnik and SFOR), but they were not needed, since [Victim No.4] showed no
signs of life.
[Victim No.3] died on the way to hospital. [Victim No.1 and No,2] were treated in the hospital
and transported to the Clinical Hospital Centre Koševo in Sarajevo. They lives are still in
danger and they are still unconscious.
The paramedic acted according to the rules of her profession.
All deminers were insured according to the requirements of the law and the National
Standards.

PPE and tools
PPE (frag jacket, and a helmet with a visor) was found to be lying away from the scene of
accident. It is obvious that it was not used at the time of accident. If it had been used, it would
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not significantly reduce the injuries. Two shears were found near the scene of the accident,
two secateurs, a small saw and an antenna for tripwire detection. No prodders and no shovels
were found. However, the team leader claimed that the deminers had PPE, detectors,
prodders, shovels, shears and base sticks.

[Blood stained shears found near the victims.]
The area was highly metal-contaminated, 20% could be cleared with the help of metaldetectors, the remaining 80% with prodders. Prodding to the required 10 cm depth was
difficult because of many stones, excavation was often used. The detectors were functional
(UPMAH detonator contained in PMA-3 could be detected at 10 cm depth [presumably in
air]).
On the day of accident, the base stick was not used in the lane where the accident occurred.
The marking with 0.5 m high sticks and a tape was not applied. Some vegetation was being
cut. Four deminers were working close to each other and one of them activated the mine,
probably by stepping on it, while pulling out some old dry branches through which some new
vegetation had grown.
The reported productivity (reported by the team leader, 8-25 m2) is realistic.

The mine
PROM-1 was probably buried to be activated with a tripwire, but it was hidden in vegetation,
so that it could be activated by stepping on it. A tripwire was not found. [The base-plate of the
mine was found and photographed.] Another PROM-1 had been found during the same
clearance operation. Another three PROM-1 mines were found in 1997. A found PMR-2A and
seven PMA-3 mines, clearly pointed to the danger.

Conclusion
The cause of the accident: wanton violation of technical and safety procedures proscribed in
the SOPs of the organisation and in the National Standards of B&H.
1. 4 persons instead of 2 working in the same lane (although 2 were planned by the
team leader).
2. PPE not worn.
3. mutual distance between deminers too small (should have been 50 m).
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4. violation of procedures by the assistant of the team leader, who took the assignment
from the team leader and allowed taking off the PPE and the work against the
prescribed procedures.

Recommendations
1. to follow SOPs and the Standard.
2. to do more internal quality control, unannounced visits are recommended.
3. to organise one-day training with all VF-B teams, to teach them about the causes of
this accident.

Victim Report
Victim number: 606

Name: [Name removed]

Age: 32

Gender: Male

Status: deminer

Fit for work: DECEASED

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not recorded

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: None

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
FATAL
COMMENT: Severe fragmentation injury. Dead at the site. No Medical report was made
available.

Victim Report
Victim number: 607

Name: [Name removed]

Age: 32

Gender: Male

Status: deminer

Fit for work: DECEASED

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not recorded

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: None

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
FATAL
COMMENT: Severe fragmentation injuries. Died on way to hospital. No Medical report was
made available.

Victim Report
Victim number: 608

Name: [Name removed]

Age: 38

Gender: Male
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Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not recorded

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: None

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
COMMENT: Severe fragmentation injuries. Unconscious in hospital at the time of the report.
No Medical report was made available.

Victim Report
Victim number: 609

Name: [Name removed]

Age: 34

Gender: Male

Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not recorded

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: None

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
severe Leg
COMMENT: Arterial bleeding. Unconscious in hospital at time of report. No Medical report
was made available.

Analysis
The investigators found that the main cause of the accident was “wanton violation of technical
and safety procedures proscribed in the SOPs of the organisation and in the National
Standards of B&H”. For this reason the primary cause of the accident is listed as a
“Management control inadequacy”. So many basic safety rules were being breached at a site
where there was known to be a fragmentation mine threat that the conditions must have been
known to senior management. The secondary cause is listed as a “Field control inadequacy”
because the field managers allowed safety distances and PPE rules to be ignored.
The failure of those with National responsibility to suspend the accreditation of those
responsible for such an unprofessional effort would be surprising if it were not for the fact that
demining group involved are apparently a branch of the national military. Nonetheless, their
lack of professionalism should be addressed with urgency.
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